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This Cyber Brief is part of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy program.  
  
 
The 2016 U.S. election constituted a watershed for democracies in the digital age. During the election cycle, fears pro-
liferated among policymakers and the public that foreign actors could exploit cyber technologies [PDF] to tamper 
with voter registration, access voting machines, manipulate storage and transmission of results, and influence election 
outcomes. Russian information operations and disinformation on social media compounded these fears about elec-
tion cybersecurity by raising questions about foreign interference with the election’s integrity. Similar worries have 
arisen with elections this year in France, Britain, and Germany, and the Netherlands opted to hand count ballots in 
its March election to prevent hacking from affecting the outcome. In May 3 testimony to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, James B. Comey, former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, indicated that Russia had tried to 
tamper with vote counts in other countries and that it might attempt to do the same in the United States in the future. 
 Technical strategies [PDF] to protect election systems from cyber interference exist, such as stopping the use of 
voting machines connected by wireless networks and deploying machines that produce auditable paper trails. How-
ever, the events of 2016 demonstrate that more high-level political action is required to manage real and perceived 
cyber vulnerabilities in election systems. Government officials and nongovernmental organizations that support 
elections should adopt measures to protect election systems from online threats, deter cyber interference with such 
systems, and reassure citizens their right to vote is defended. Achieving these objectives requires local, national, and 
international actions to strengthen cybersecurity in election systems and to elevate election integrity in cybersecu-
rity policies, human rights activities, and election assistance and monitoring.  
B A C K G R O U N D   
Digital technologies and the internet have affected how elections are conducted, including through internet voting 
and online voter registration. Although reliance on computers and communication networks for elections has gar-
nered some attention [PDF], election cybersecurity has not been politically prominent within democracies.  
In the United States, the Constitution assigns responsibility [PDF] for elections to state governments. This 
“clunky” system means hackers have to breach numerous state and local electoral processes to achieve broad im-
pact. After the “hanging chad” controversy of the 2000 election, Congress funded the adoption of electronic voting 
machines, which made computer, information, and network security critical to electoral integrity. The federal Elec-
tion Assistance Commission (EAC) issued voluntary voting guidelines in 2005, which included security guidance 
for software, telecommunications, and wireless communications. However, in 2014, the Presidential Commission 
on Election Administration asserted [PDF] that the EAC’s process of adopting guidelines “has broken down” be-
cause of “a lack of commissioners” and “disagreement over the agency’s mission.” This commission identified ten-
sions between computer experts and election officials over the security of electronic voting technologies. Although 
cybersecurity risks grew significantly after 2005 in the public and private sectors, the EAC took a decade to update 
its guidelines [PDF] to address these and other risks to election security.  
Interest in, and security concerns about, electronic voting have also arisen in other democracies. Some, such as 
Estonia and Switzerland, began using online voting, but others returned to paper ballots after trying electronic vot-
ing technologies. The Council of Europe made recommendations for electronically enabled elections in 2004 and 
began updating them in 2015 to address technological developments, including new cybersecurity risks. 
However, cybersecurity policies over the last decade have reflected little interest in elections. To date, most de-
mocracies have not specifically criminalized cyber interference with election systems. Policy on cyber terrorism 
focuses on threats to critical infrastructure, but it appears no government designated election systems critical infra-
structure until the United States in January 2017. Studies of cyber espionage and cyber warfare have not highlighted 
election cybersecurity. Cybersecurity efforts in U.S. states are uneven in effectiveness, and pre-2016 analysis of 
state-level policies [PDF] rarely focused on elections. 
  
 
C H A L L E N G E S  F O R  E L E C T I O N  C Y B E R S E C U R I T Y  
In the United States, the constitutional assignment of election management to the states raises federalism problems 
for improving election cybersecurity. For example, state election officials [PDF], some members of Congress 
[PDF], and an EAC commissioner opposed the federal government’s designation of election systems as critical in-
frastructure. Additionally, the EAC has often lacked sufficient commissioners to function effectively, and proposed 
legislation seeks to terminate it. After the 2000 election, the federal government provided funds to help states mod-
ernize election systems, but when that funding ended, states often did not devote resources to improve and sustain 
updated systems.  
Internationally, many democracies [PDF] are concerned about cyber threats to election systems. However, na-
tionalist and populist movements have preoccupied the United States and European democracies with domestic 
problems and difficult relations over trade, defense and security issues, and Russia.  
Generating U.S. leadership on election cybersecurity will be a challenge because the Donald J. Trump admin-
istration is unlikely to prioritize it. Without evidence, President Trump has attacked the U.S. election system as 
“rigged” by elites and riddled with domestic fraud, and he shows no willingness to confront Russia over its influence 
operations during the 2016 U.S. election or the 2017 elections in European democracies. This state of affairs re-
quires actions at home and abroad not dependent on White House leadership.  
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  
A comprehensive strategy should heighten the political attention cybersecurity receives in efforts to ensure the in-
tegrity of elections; it should also make election integrity a more important part of cybersecurity policy.  
At the state level, governors can make election cybersecurity a priority by supporting the election cybersecurity 
task force created by the National Association of Secretaries of State and turning the election aspects of the 2016–
2017 Meet the Threat cybersecurity initiative of the National Governors Association (NGA) into a permanent 
component of the NGA’s activities. States’ attorneys general can raise the political profile of election cybersecurity 
by tackling it in the National Association of Attorneys General’s special committee on internet safety/cyber privacy 
and security. 
At the federal level, the designation of election systems as critical infrastructure should remain. The designation 
ensures election systems receive priority cybersecurity assistance from the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). The designation does not threaten federalism, and it facilitates information sharing and technical assistance. 
DHS, supported by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, should take responsibility for issuing 
guidelines on election cybersecurity. Additionally, the Department of State should expand the U.S. intelligence 
community’s information sharing with European countries on election cyber threats into a multi-democracy initi-
ative on election cybersecurity, perhaps through the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise or by partnering with the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.  
At the international level, intergovernmental and nongovernmental bodies that monitor elections and provide 
assistance to electoral systems should craft harmonized international principles on the use of electronic voting tech-
nologies. These principles should address, among other things, election cybersecurity and should draw on recom-
mendations from governments, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. The National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) has identified common features of existing recommendations, including on election 
system cybersecurity.  
  
 
A model for developing harmonized principles is the NDI’s collaboration with the UN Electoral Assistance Di-
vision on the principles for international election observation [PDF]. Under this model, election observation mech-
anisms, such as those operated by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization 
of American States, should participate. Similarly, nongovernmental leaders in election observation and assistance, 
such as the Carter Center and the International Forum for Electoral Systems, should contribute to developing the 
harmonized principles. 
Such layered state, federal, and international actions would deter cyberattacks on election systems by making 
such attacks more difficult, costly, and ineffective. Furthermore, democracies should add specific offenses for inter-
fering with election systems to domestic cybercrime laws and the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime. 
Criminal law should support the prosecution of hacking of election systems as it does cybercrime, cyber espionage, 
and economic cyber espionage.  
Democratic countries that have not already done so should declare that their election systems are critical infra-
structure and that international law and cyber norms protecting critical infrastructure apply to such systems. De-
mocracies should articulate that cyber interference with election systems violates the international legal principles 
of sovereignty and nonintervention; they should also identify diplomatic, trade, travel, and financial countermeas-
ures, such as economic sanctions [PDF], that they will impose against state actors responsible for such interference. 
In addition, democracies should emphasize election cybersecurity’s importance in protecting the human right to 
vote in free and fair elections. European democracies should pursue this goal in the European Union and Council 
of Europe and seek action in the UN human rights system, such as updating the authoritative guidance on voting 
rights issued in 1996 to address, among other things, election cybersecurity. 
Allegations of, and fears about, cyber meddling in election systems undermine confidence in the democratic pro-
cess and threaten citizens’ trust in voting. Protection and deterrence are necessary, but reassuring voters of the im-
portance and effectiveness of election cybersecurity policies is also critical. The threats of foreign information op-
erations and disinformation spreading through social media during elections make reassurance on election cyber-
security even more important.  
First, government officials and nongovernmental organizations should identify the cyber threats election sys-
tems face before election cycles. Information about these threats would provide citizens with facts and guidance 
that can help make them less susceptible to rumors, disinformation, and sensationalist fears that are spread on social 
media. Second, government officials responsible for administering elections should demonstrate they can defend 
election systems from cyber threats through, among other things, explaining protective actions, testing defensive 
measures, and participating in oversight processes. Third, as election cycles unfold, officials should make clear to 
the media and the public how they are protecting election systems from cyber interference. Reassurance should 
include postelection reviews and revision of election cybersecurity strategies as needed. 
Protection, deterrence, and reassurance measures will strengthen election cybersecurity and can support calls 
to upgrade outdated voting machines [PDF] and identify the next generation of voting technologies. Internet 
freedom is in trouble, and cyber-subversion threats to democratic elections also include operations against can-
didates, political parties, and the dissemination of fake news. Efforts to address these problems are underway, 
including the Protect Your Election initiative for journalists and news organizations and strategies to combat 
disinformation on social media. Similarly, democracies should not allow cyber threats to election systems—real 
or perceived—to undermine the role voting plays in democratic sovereignty and individual liberty. Fortunately, 
election cybersecurity is within reach everywhere citizens cast votes.  
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